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Abstract 
The concept of reality is often raised in the context of philosophical 
foundations of physics or interpretations of quantum mechanics.  When 
this term is so raised, it is a warning to me that I’m about to be led 
down a rabbit hole.  Such diversions usually lead nowhere unless you 
consider endless discussions of Schrödinger’s cat, wave function 
collapse, quantum non-locality, and parallel universes to be useful.  A 
prime example is the famous Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen paper 
wherein they concluded that the quantum wave function cannot provide 
a complete description of physical reality.  In this essay, I suggest that, 
in physics discourse, the term ‘reality’ should be avoided at all costs. 
 
Against Measurement 
 Let me begin by reminding you of a paper by John S. Bell.  No, not that one.  I’m 
not talking about his 1964 paper “On the Einstein Podolsky Rosen (EPR) Paradox”, in 
which he introduced his now famous inequality; although, we’ll get to that paper as well 
as the EPR paper momentarily.  I’m referring to Bell’s 1990 paper entitled “Against 
‘Measurement’”.  In this paper, Bell lamented how “uncertainty over terms such as 
‘apparatus’ is still rife in serious discussions of quantum mechanics”.  Bell sought an 
“exact formulation” of quantum mechanics “with nothing left to the discretion of the 
theoretical physicist”.  He maintained that some words have no place in such a 
formulation, words such as system, apparatus, environment, microscopic, macroscopic, 
reversible, irreversible, observable, information, and measurement.  According to Bell, 
the worst of these is “measurement”, hence the title of his paper; 
The first charge against 'measurement', in the fundamental axioms of  																																																								
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quantum mechanics, is that it anchors there the shifty split of the world  
into 'system' and 'apparatus'…The word has had such a damaging effect  
on the discussion, that I think it should now be banned altogether in  
quantum mechanics.   
The shifty split to which Bell is referring is the Copenhagen interpretation’s maxim that 
while microscopic systems are described by quantum mechanics, macroscopic 
experiments are to be described by classical physics.  Even though Bell offended my 
experimentalist’s sensibilities with such phrases as “piddling laboratory operations” and 
“the petty world of the laboratory”, I agree with him that careless use of some of the 
above terms has contributed to the conundrums encountered when grappling with the 
foundations of quantum mechanics. 
 Bell, clever man that he was, did not directly refer to the “reality” of the natural 
world, the term that I suggest should be avoided at all costs; however, he did, in effect, 
put this word into the mouths of others.1   Still, one get’s the feeling that this concept is 
lurking just below the surface in his paper.  When he remarks, 
But experiment is a tool. The aim remains: to understand the world. To  
restrict quantum mechanics to be exclusively about piddling laboratory  
operations is to betray the great enterprise. A serious formulation will  
not exclude the big world outside the laboratory, 
I have the impression he means that quantum mechanics should not be simply a theory 
that predicts the results of measurements, but rather, a theory that provides a description 
of reality.  One might likewise accuse me of putting words in Bell’s mouth and that 
might, indeed, be the case.  However, in the very first paragraph of his paper he opines, 
 Surely, after 62 years, we should have an exact formulation of some  
serious part of quantum mechanics…I mean too, by 'serious', that  
'apparatus' should not be separated off from the rest of the world into 
black boxes, as if it were not made of atoms and not ruled by quantum  
mechanics. 
He clearly thinks that the current formulation of quantum mechanics is lacking.   
The bulk of his paper is then devoted to “the measurement problem” and the 
implied “collapse of the wave function”, dilemmas that arise in the context of ascribing 
reality to quantum states.  He proceeds with discussions of commentaries by Dirac, 																																																								1	For	example,	he	declares	that	Gottfried	supposes	that	wave	function	collapse	“really”	takes	place	and	that	van	Kampen	identifies	“realities”	that	characterize	the	results	of	experiments.	
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Landau, Gottfried, von Neumann, and van Kampen, critiques with which I heartily agree.  
However, whereas Marcel Reginatto and I concluded that these dilemmas are faux 
problems (Boughn & Reginatto 2013), Bell clearly thinks they are legitimate questions to 
be answered.  This is made abundantly clear in the final section of the paper entitled, 
“Towards a precise quantum mechanics”, in which he declares, 
It seems to me that the only hope of precision with the dual (Ψ, 𝑥)  
kinematics is to omit completely the shifty split, and let both Ψ and  𝑥 refer to the [real] world as a whole, 
where Ψ denotes a quantum state and 𝑥 classical variables (and where I have, again, put 
a word in Bell’s mouth).  This is precisely the picture presented in de Broglie-Bohm 
mechanics.  Bell also points out another way to avoid the vagueness of wave function 
collapse and that is to modify Schrödinger’s equation to include a stochastic collapse 
mechanism as in the Ghiradi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) scheme.  In the end Bell concludes 
that currently (as of 1990):  
At least two roads are open from there [orthodox theories] towards a  
precise theory, it seems to me. Both eliminate the shifty split [between  
quantum system and measurement apparatus]. The de Broglie-Bohm 
type theories retain, exactly, the linear wave equation, and so necessarily  
add complementary variables to express the non-waviness of the world  
on the macroscopic scale. The GRW-type theories have nothing in their 
kinematics but the wavefunction. It gives the density (in a multidimensional 
configuration space!) of stuff. To account for the narrowness of that stuff  
in macroscopic dimensions, the linear Schrödinger equation has to be  
modified, in the GRW picture by a mathematically prescribed spontaneous 
collapse mechanism. 
 
I maintain that Bell has, indeed, led us down a rabbit hole, that is, unless you consider 
de Broglie-Bohm mechanics or the GRW statistical collapse theory to be eminently 
reasonable approaches. 
 
EPR Paradox 
 The 1935 Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen paper, “Can Quantum-Mechanical 
Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?”, was notable in that it gave an 
explicit criterion of reality.  I first read the EPR paper when I was in graduate school and 
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was mystified. I had assumed the paper would present an argument about the self-
consistency of quantum mechanics or lack there of.  Instead, it seemed to be less about 
physics and more about the philosophical issue of what constitutes reality. The 
conclusion of EPR was quite simply that quantum mechanics “does not provide a 
complete description of the physical reality.”  In fact, the paper was penned by Podolsky 
and Einstein was not happy with it (Howard 2007).  
Howard points out that in a letter to Schrödinger, written a month after the EPR 
paper was published, Einstein chose to base his argument for incompleteness on what he 
termed the “separation principle” and continued to present this argument “in virtually all 
subsequent published and unpublished discussions of the problem”. According to the 
separation principle, the real state of affairs in one part of space cannot be affected 
instantaneously or superluminally by events in a distant part of space. Suppose AB is the 
joint state of two systems, A and B, that interact and subsequently move away from each 
other to different locations. (Schrödinger (1935) would later introduce the term entangled 
to describe such a joint state.)  In his letter to Schrödinger, Einstein explained (Howard 
2007) 
After the collision, the real state of (AB) consists precisely of the real  
state A and the real state of B, which two states have nothing to do with  
one another. The real state of B thus cannot depend upon the kind of  
measurement I carry out on A [separation principle]. But then for the  
same state of B there are two (in general arbitrarily many) equally justified  
[wave functions] Ψ!, which contradicts the hypothesis of a one-to-one or  
complete description of the real states. 
His conclusion was that quantum mechanics does not provide a complete description of 
reality.  Note that Einstein’s separation principle did not claim that a measurement of 
system A has no effect on the result of any measurement on system B but rather that a 
measurement of system A has no effect on the real state of system B.  So even in his 
revised argument, Einstein relies on the notion of the “real state” of a system, that is, the 
notion that the state of a system constitutes an aspect of reality.  Again, we’ve been led 
down a rabbit hole.  If Einstein’s separation principle had stopped at “a measurement of 
system A has no effect on the result of any measurement on system B”, a principle that is 
completely consistent with standard quantum theory, then there would be no basis for his 
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argument that quantum mechanics does not provide a complete description of reality.2 
 
The Many-Worlds Interpretation 
There is another theory, Hugh Everett’s so-called many worlds interpretation, that 
directly addresses both the shifty split between the quantum system and measurement 
apparatus and the collapse of the wave function.3  This interpretation is considered by 
some to be mainstream (but certainly not by me).  Everett sought to remove the shifty 
split as well as eliminate wave function collapse by postulating a universal wave function 
that never collapses but continues to evolve according to the Schrödinger equation.  
Furthermore, the universal wave function describes everything in the universe, including 
the measuring apparatus and observer of that apparatus.  The standard interpretation, 
introduced by DeWitt and Graham (1973), is that whenever a measurement is made all 
possible outcomes are realized, each in a different universe, i.e., the universe splits into 
many.  The universal wave function describes the entire multiverse of these many worlds.  
I agree with van Kampen (see footnote 3) that this is a “mind-boggling fantasy” and 
certainly qualifies as descending down a rabbit hole.  On the other hand, Everett did not 
characterize his “theory of the universal wave function” as implying the existence of a 
multiverse consisting of many real worlds. In fact, Everett’s theory is much more 
nuanced and it is telling that in his theory of the universal wave function, the words 
“real” and “reality” only appear within quotation marks (DeWitt & Graham 1973).  He 
seems to be warning us about the danger of taking these terms too literally.  In an 
appendix he even advises us to avoid the tendency of identifying highly successful 
physical models with “reality” itself.4  So I will refrain from accusing Everett of leading 
us down a rabbit hole; however, the subsequent expounders of his theory certainly have. 
 
Bell’s Theorem and Quantum Non-locality 
 Bell’s 1964 paper on the EPR paradox is considered by some to be one of the 																																																								2	On	the	other	hand,	I	quite	agree	that	quantum	mechanics	does	not	provide	a	complete	description	but	for	entirely	different	reasons	(Boughn	2017,	Boughn	&	Reginatto	2019).	3	Bell	didn’t	comment	on	this	theory	directly	in	his	1990	paper	but	quotes	van	Kampen’s	assessment	noting	that	van	Kampen	has	no	patience	for	“such	mind-boggling	fantasies	as	the	many	world	interpretation”.	4	I’ve	discussed	Everett’s	theory	in	detail	elsewhere.	(Boughn	2018)	
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most important papers ever written on the foundations of quantum mechanics.  My 
assessment is more modest as I have expressed elsewhere (Boughn 2016, 2017).  Bell  
characterized the EPR argument as: “an argument that quantum mechanics could not be a 
complete theory but should be supplemented by additional variables. These additional 
variables were to restore to the theory causality and locality.”  He then proceeds to add 
hidden variables that restore causality and locality but demonstrates that the predictions 
of the resulting theory satisfy an inequality (Bell’ theorem) that is inconsistent with the 
predictions of quantum mechanics.  While Bell’s is a mischaracterization of EPR’s 
claim5, it certainly captures what many felt was a serious problem with quantum 
mechanics.  In fact, by 1927 Einstein had already attempted a hidden variable model of 
Schrödinger’s wave mechanics and failed because he “could not find a way around the 
entanglement” (Howard 2007).  I suspect Einstein would not have been very impressed 
by Bell’s proof.  Like his 1990 paper, Bell’s 1964 paper never mentions “reality”, except 
for a quote from EPR.  However, again the notion of reality lurks just below the surface.  
For what are these hidden variables but properties of an underlying physical reality?  
They have well defined classical values not subject to the vagaries of quantum 
mechanics.   
The only way Bell could mitigate his conclusion was by introducing “…a 
mechanism whereby the setting of one measuring device can influence the reading of 
another instrument, however remote. Moreover, the signal involved must propagate 
instantaneously, so that such a theory could not be Lorentz invariant.”  Of course, 
Einstein would have surely rejected this possibility6.  Even so, this was not the end of 
Bell’s quantum quandaries.  Recall, that he was extremely bothered by the “shifty split” 
between quantum system and classical measuring apparatus and by the dilemma of wave 
function collapse. 
He sought to resolve both of these with his “theory of local beables” (Bell 1975).  																																																								5	Rather,	EPR	claimed	that	“…the	wave	function	does	not	provide	a	complete	description	of	the	reality…”	but	they	“…left	open	whether	or	not	such	a	description	exists.		[They]	believe,	however,	that	such	a	theory	is	possible.”	6	Although,	it	should	be	noted	that	de	Broglie-Bohm	mechanics,	which	Bell	was	intrigued	by,	did	predict	such	superluminal	signals.   	
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Bell endeavored to precisely embed classical notions in quantum mechanics in a way that 
observables cannot be.  “Beables” provided such a device.  The very name “beable” 
indicates that Bell fancies them as part of an underlying physical reality; although, of 
course, he doesn’t use the word “reality”. He comes close when he designates beables as 
“physical” and wave functions as “non-physical”.  In an analogy with electromagnetic 
fields, which are physical, and electromagnetic potentials, which are non-physical, Bell 
indicates that it doesn’t matter that the electromagnetic scalar potential propagates with 
infinite velocity because “It is not really supposed to be there.  It is just a mathematical 
convenience.” [my italics]  Again, the notion of reality is just below the surface.  These 
beables take the place of hidden variables in his 1964 paper and so it’s not surprising that 
he concludes that this (potentially) precise formulation of quantum mechanics 
demonstrates that there is a “gross non-locality of nature”.7  So again, attributing “reality” 
to some aspect of nature has led us down a rabbit hole.  In the next section, I’ll elaborate 
on just why this is the case. 
 
Why ‘Reality’ Doesn’t Belong in Physics 
 You will have noticed that of the 5 works I referred to above, only one, the EPR 
paper, referred to the reality of the physical world.  This was partly by design.  I wanted 
to draw your attention to the fact that even when “reality” isn’t directly invoked, it’s often 
lurking just below the surface.  On the other hand, in more philosophical works about the 
foundations of quantum mechanics, physical reality is often right up front.  For example, 
in the collection of essays by philosopher Alyssa Ney and physicist-philosopher David 
Albert, The Wave Function: Essays on the Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics (2013),  
6 of the 10 essays have either realism or ontology in their titles and their common theme 
concerns the reality of the Schrödinger wave function.  In the popular press, the nature of 
physical reality is a recurrent theme.  One of my friends recently sent me a PBS Digital 
Studios YouTube video (1.5 million hits), “How the Quantum Eraser Rewrites the Past”. 
The first words out of the narrator’s mouth were “Can reality be adjusted after events 
have occurred?” The outcomes of these forays invariably lead to trips down a rabbit hole. 
 So what’s my resolution of the problems of wave function collapse and the shifty 																																																								7	Although,	Bell	proves	that	this	non-locality	cannot	be	used	for	superluminal	communication.	
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split between a quantum system and a classical measurement apparatus?  I maintain these 
are quandaries that don’t need resolution.  Physical theories are models, human 
inventions, that help us to understand nature as well as to build new devices and make 
predictions based on these models.  In quantum mechanics, wave functions are used to 
specify the state of a system. Wave function collapse is simply a mnemonic for updating 
a wave function to account for new information about a system, “just as it would be in 
classical statistical theory” (Stapp 1972).  The problem of the shifty split between 
quantum system and classical measurement seems more complicated; however, Bohr 
didn’t seem to be bothered by it.  Let’s see why.  Consider his following brief description 
of a measurement (Bohr 1963, p. 3):  
The decisive point is to recognize that the description of the experimental 
arrangement and the recordings of observations must be given in plain  
language, suitably refined by the usual terminology. This is a simple  
logical demand, since by the word ‘experiment’ we can only mean a  
procedure regarding which we are able to communicate to others what we  
have done and what we have learnt.  
Nowhere in this description does he refer to classical physics. In fact, descriptions of 
measurements are not included in either quantum or classical physics.  They are part of 
Bohr's “procedure regarding which we are able to communicate to others what we have 
done and what we have learnt.”  If there is a shifty split between physical theory and 
measurement in quantum theory, it’s also present between classical theory and 
measurement.  Because physicists have long since become comfortable with the relation 
between theory and measurement in classical physics, perhaps the quantum case 
shouldn't be viewed as particularly problematic.8  
 To be sure, probing well-established theories to discover previously unknown 
physical phenomena is a tried-and-true enterprise in physics; however, these endeavors 
involve specific observable effects predicted by physical theories.  Such predictions are 
possible because of the well-defined meaning of statements made within the context of 
the theories.  On the other hand, the invention of new theories are usually motivated by 
new experiments and observations that either contradict or fail to be described by 																																																								8	Marcel	and	I	have	dealt	with	this	topic	in	more	detail	elsewhere	(Boughn	&	Reginatto	2013,	2019).		Einstein	(1936)	was	also	well	aware	of	this	situation	and	seemed	not	to	be	bothered	by	it	in	the	least.	
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previous theories.  To be sure, there are other legitimate reasons for seeking to create new 
theories, for example, unification and simplification.  The search for a quantum theory of 
gravity falls in this category; although, as an experimentalist, I have less interest in efforts 
that don’t involve experimental verification.   
However, questions involving the “reality” of aspects of a theory are not of this 
sort.  Reality is a perfectly respectable topic in everyday conversation.  What’s the harm 
in inquiring about the reality of the natural world?  In short, the harm is that these 
questions invariably lead nowhere.  That such quandaries as wave function collapse, the 
quantum classical divide, Schrödinger’s cat, and the non-locality of entangled quantum 
states have remained unresolved after more than 80 years is evidence of this fact.  
Furthermore, the resolutions advanced to solve these reality problems invariably serve no 
pragmatic purpose.  Standard quantum mechanics is quite capable of handling all of the 
scenarios mentioned above, including the quantum eraser.  There are no unanswered 
physics questions that need be addressed in this way. 
 Am I an idealist , or perhaps, a logical positivist?  I would say not.  I take for 
granted that there’s a real physical world out there; after all, I experience it every 
morning when I wake up.  It’s the job of physicists to try to understand that reality by 
creating physical models that can be verified through experiment and observation.  That’s 
all I need to know about reality.  One might argue that pursuing such unresolvable 
metaphysical issues can lead to the creation of useful new theories.  I have no doubt that 
many physicists’ physical intuition comes about by trying to imagine why the natural 
world is the way it is.  They subsequently use this physical intuition to create new 
theories that can be subsequently tested experimentally.  I’m quite prepared to admit that 
this is sometimes, or even often, the case.  On the other hand, an examination of the 
sources of scientific creativity is certainly beyond my poor powers and I won’t attempt to 
address that topic here. 
 
Note added in proof:  After posting this paper, Hrvoje Nikolić drew my attention to a 
similarly entitled paper, “Against ‘Realism’”, by Travis Norsen (2007).  While this paper 
was similarly motivated by EPR and Bell’s theorem (with a title similarly motivated by 
Bell’s 1990 paper), Norsen was exclusively interested in the misuse of the notion of 
“local realism” in discussions of Bell’s theorem and, unlike my advice, he did “not think 
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the word [realism] should be banned altogether”.  Norsen also accepts the manifest non-
locality of quantum mechanics and considers wave function collapse to be a crucial 
quantum postulate, both with which I disagree. 
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